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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960-110 CA 
v. : 
RANDOLPH PAUL STRUHS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF Att^L. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to his conditional guilty plea, defendant was convicted of possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
SUita ul Ims jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
( 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did police action in parking a patrol car facing defendant's truck and 
illuminating tilt an i iliii llu Mini, Ii ul jwiki'il ii IIIPIII IMIII IK IIPIII , oil, 
isolated construction the officers had been called to investigate criminal 
activity in the past, constitute an illegal detention? 
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion to believe defendant was involved in criminal activity? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews factual findings underlying the trial court's decision for clear 
error, and will find clear error only if the trial court's factual findings are not 
adequately supported in the record. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 
1996) (citing State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of 
law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. IsL (Citing Eena, 869 P.2d at 936; State v. Deli. 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV (1791): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 (1896): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Information with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann 
08-J/ 6{2)('d)il) ( i v , in, iiiiiiiiiivviiil possession ill iiiii;,1", piii.iplicrnaiia, .1 class i) 
iniiscleiiHtarn i ^inl.ilion i Il I Kali dule Ami §58-37a-5 (1981), and tampering w ith 
evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-510 (1973) (R. 
12-14). 
I he evidence tampering cliaigi1 \A \V lulucd and die inionnatiou amended (a 
ttwhnk it chittpir of dm \\\y \ Irilr under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a class B 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1995) (R. 1546). 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized against him (R, 46). Deputy 
bneriit biieen Jh^i,t^i'.- %^ i v;iiuwM .•*...-- . „... u ^ ,;. . - \ 
natter unde
 : *
 i;
 -~^-. ^ 
60-62).l 
In a written ruling, the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion (R. 23-
26).2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, and to preserve uppressie.. ._ , 
1
 See appendix A. 
2
 See appendix B. 
3 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(I) 
(1995), and the other counts were dismissed (R. 86-93, 104, 105). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, stayed the prison 
time pending three years probation, with one year in the Davis County Jail, and 
suspended this jail time pending resolution of this appeal (R. 105-106). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 11, 1995 (R. 35-37). In a 
memorandum decision filed December 29, 1995, this Court summarily dismissed this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because a final judgment had not been entered (R. 84, 98 
[double-sided]). 
Pursuant to a stipulation on the conditional nature of the plea (R. 104), the trial 
court signed the judgment imposing the above-described sentence (R. 105-106). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment on June 24, 1996 (R. 107-
109). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State 
v. Patefield. 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. November 7, 1996) (citing State v. 
Delanev. 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994)). 
At about 10 p.m.on March 3, 1995, Deputy Sheriff Eileen Knighton, a police 
officer with five years' experience, was on graveyard shift with her partner patrolling 
4 
North Salt Lake in a Chevrolet Blazer sheriffs department patrol vehicle (R. 47, 53). 
She was traveling west on Center Street, when she saw a pickup truck a half mile o M 
ahead going toward a remote construction site (R, 48), As she watched, thv, .ruck 
pulled into the construction iiica, lucked iiiii l .i iiii III ili.il JIHI 1Ru.nl I losul IIIIIINI 
parked The pickup truck's headlights were turned off. IJL The deputy guessed it 
was "a couple of hundred feet" from where the truck was parked to the nearest 
construction vehicles in the area (K 
• • 1 h e d e p i it) be came si ispic lull lmU<i 'nukl c mini that . • •.,••• 
isolated area late at n ight when no une was work,r*c and where 'there were a lot of 
construction vehicles, equipment, building materials, and supplies (R 48) She was 
also suspicious because the construction site was a high crime area where she had been 
C « . . w c * . , . . , 1 L ~ . ~ *, 
i - ., .~ * ~ .« nulled her patrol vehicle into the area 
with its headlights off, and parked directly in iront of the truck "maybe a car length or 
so away" (R. 49),4 The occupants of the truck had not gotten out (R 52). After 
1 . -m the light bar ihe vehicle, to illuminate the area (R. 49).5 As she did, she 
4
 Defendant's statement of facts omits this detail that provides the distance 
between the vehicles when they were parked "nose to nose" (Def. Br, at 8), 
5 ^ white light on 'the light bar atop the vehicle rep". :tl H <• sprttltgl'iK 
which sheriffs patrol vehicles used to be equipped (R. 531 
5 . ' . . ' 
and her partner saw three individuals in the truck, two males and a female, who looked 
up and toward the patrol vehicle. I$L The deputy did not activate either the red and 
blue flashing lights on top of the patrol vehicle, or the grill lights (R. 53). 
The deputy testified that if she were effecting a stop of a vehicle, she would 
activate all the vehicle lights, including the overhead flashing red and blue lights and 
grill lights, and that the different lights are activated by separate switches (R. 55). The 
purpose in activating only the headlights and the white overhead light was to illuminate 
the area before the deputy went to talk to the occupants of the pickup truck (R. 49-50). 
The items defendant moved to suppress were seized after the deputy and her 
partner approached and investigated the occupants of the truck (R. 50). The Probable 
Cause Statement in support of the Information reflects that a search of the vehicle 
"revealed numerous syringes, spoons and lighters" and that "defendant was found to be 
in possession of a syringe which contained a controlled substance [cocaine]" (R. 13: cf. 
R. 92-93). 
Under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). In its Memorandum Decision on the motion, the trial 
court made the following findings and conclusions: 
1. The Court finds that on or about March 3, 1995, at 
approximately 9:58 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Eilene [sic] Knighton, while 
proceeding West Bound on Center Street, observed Defendant's vehicle 
6 
traveling into a construction zone area located in North Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which, based on her five (5) years of experience as a peace officer, 
the Deputy noted was a prior spot for illegal activity. 
2. That Deputy Knighton also observed Defendant's vehicle stop 
and the head lights extinguish when Defendant's vehicle entered an area 
where construction vehicles and equipment were located. 
3. However, the Court finds that no one emerged from 
Defendant's vehicle after it stopped and its head lights were turned off. 
4. That Deputy Knighton turned off the head lights on her patrol 
vehicle and coasted to the front of Defendant's vehicle where the fronts of 
there respective vehicles faced each other. 
5. At that point, the Court finds that Deputy Knighton activated 
the white overhead lights on her patrol vehicle, also referred to as "take 
down" lights, as well as her high-beam headlights, which enabled Deputy 
Knighton to observe suspicious movements within the defendant's vehicle 
and eventually led to her discovery of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia within Defendant's vehicle. However, the Court 
specifically finds that at no time did Deputy Knighton activate the red and 
blue emergency lights on her patrol vehicle. 
In the instant case, the Court finds the foregoing factual finding 
particularly significant because Defendant's primary argument centers 
around the very contention that at the moment Deputy Knighton activated 
the overhead lights on her vehicle, a display of authority occurred which 
constituted a detention subject to Fourth Amendment protection under 
State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, Defendant 
correctly cites to and relies on Davis for the proposition set forth above. 
However, the facts in Davis are silent as to the specific type of overhead 
lights the officer in that case activated, i.e., whether or ot the overhead 
lights were the white lights/"take down" lights, the red and blue 
emergency lights, or both. 
Thus, while Defendant's argument is not misplaced, the facts 
contained in Davis are simply not specific enough for this Court to 
conclude that a detention occurred at the moment Deputy Knighton 
activated the white overhead lights on her patrol vehicle. Furthermore, 
the Court need not specifically address the merits of this issue because, 
even assuming arguendo that a detention did in fact occur at the moment 
when the overhead lights were activated, Deputy Knighton had reasonable 
suspicion, based on articulable facts, that Defendant had either committed 
7 
a crime, was in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to 
commit a crime. 
Once again, prior to activating the overhead lights on her patrol 
vehicle, Deputy Knighton observed Defendant's vehicle on a Friday, at 
9:58 p.m, in an area known for prior illegal activity. Finally, Deputy 
Knighton observed Defendant's vehicle stop in an area where construction 
vehicles and equipment were located, at which time the head lights on 
Defendant's vehicle were extinguished. However, no one emerged from 
Defendant's vehicle. 
Therefore, when considering the aforementioned findings of fact, 
to wit: findings of fact 1-4, the Court finds that Deputy Knighton 
unquestionably had reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that 
criminal activity was afoot prior to the time she activated the overhead 
lights on her patrol vehicle. 
Thus, given that, the Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
(R. 23-25; Appendix C) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Not a Fourth Amendment seizure. Under the totality of the circumstances, 
Deputy Knighton's actions in parking her patrol vehicle "a car length or so away" 
facing the front of the pickup truck in which defendant was an occupant, and 
illuminating the area, did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The 
deputy was justified in further investigating when a pickup truck pulled into an isolated 
construction site late at night, parked, and its lights were turned off. 
2. Reasonable suspicion in any event. Even assuming, arguendo, the officer's 
actions did constituted a seizure, she had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify her 
actions. As noted, defendant's pickup truck pulled into an isolated construction area 
S 
late at night, parked, and its lights were turned off. At that time of night, there was no 
one working at the site, which contained a lot of equipment and supplies. Finally, it 
was a high crime area, and the deputy had been called to this site more than once in the 
past to investigate suspicious activity. The trial court's findings and ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the subsequent search were 
correct and should not be disturbed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEPUTY 
KNIGHTON'S ACTIONS IN PARKING HER PATROL VEHICLE 
"A CAR LENGTH OR SO AWAY" FACING THE FRONT OF 
DEFENDANT'S PICKUP TRUCK, AND ILLUMINATING THE 
AREA, DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEIZURE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Defendant argues that he was seized without reasonable suspicion the moment 
Deputy Knighton activated her headlights and the overhead light of her patrol vehicle, 
illuminating the area around the pickup truck in which he was an occupant (Def. Br. at 
11-18). On the contrary, Deputy Knighton's action constituted a permissible "level 
one" police-citizen encounter, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 88 
S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
Under Terry and its progeny, there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, 
each requiring a different degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. 
Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, n.l at 15 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
9 
1992). The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions a suspect. An 
officer may stop and question a person at any time so long as that person "is not 
detained against his [or her] will." LL The next level is reached when an officer 
temporarily seizes a person. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer 
must have "articulable suspicion" that the suspect has committed or is about to commit 
a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. I$L The third level is arrest, 
which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been or is 
about to be committed. IJL 
The test for when a seizure occurs is objective and "depends on when the person 
reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is no longer 
free to leave." State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Ramirez. 
817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991)). 
Defendant argues that he was detained against his will by a show of authority at 
the moment the deputy activated the headlights and white overhead light on her vehicle. 
Defendant's analysis is marred by omission of a critical fact related to the distance 
between the parked vehicles, and by the nature of the lights used by the deputy. 
A. Not blocked in. Defendant asserts that the deputy parked the patrol vehicle 
"nose to nose" with defendant's truck "thereby blocking" it in (Def. Br. at 11). 
In State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.3 (Utah App. 1989), this Court cited 
cases in other jurisdictions that have held that when an officer blocks a defendant's 
10 
vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred even 
though the original stop was not initiated by the officer. The Court noted that the Ninth 
Circuit found a seizure in United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987), since 
"it was not possible for the defendant to drive around the officer's patrol car/' IiL 
Such is not the evidence in defendant's case. 
The following is Deputy Knighton's uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony: 
Q As you approached the vehicle, how did you approach it? 
A I just went down Center Street until I got almost to the vehicle, 
maybe a car length or so away, and then I parked in front of the vehicle 
which was facing eastbound on Center Street and I was westbound on 
Center Street. So in effect we were nose to nose, if you can put it that 
way. . . 
(R. 49; emphasis added). Defendant's characterization is therefore in error. 
Defendant's truck was not blocked in. He has cited no record facts to establish that it 
was not possible to drive around the patrol car. Hence, Smith and Kerr do not apply 
here. 
B. Illumination of area not a show of authority. Defendant cites State v. 
Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991), in support of his argument that a detention 
occurred by a show of authority when the officer activated the overhead light on the 
patrol vehicle (Def. Br. at 16-17). As the trial court in defendant's case pointed out, it 
is not clear whether the "overhead lights" in Davis were stationary white lights, red 
and blue flashing lights, or both (R. 24). It is, nevertheless, undisputed in defendant's 
11 
case that the overhead light used was a stationary "clear white light" (R. 49) to 
illuminate the area, not the patrol vehicle's red and blue flashing lights. 
There is case support for the fact that "red lights" (State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 
674, 675 (Utah 1986), "a flashing red light" (Malina v. Gonzalez. 994 F.2d 1121, 
1123, 1126 (5th Cir. 1993), or "flashing lights and siren" (Horta v. Sullivan. 4 F.3d 2, 
11 (1st Cir. 1993), constitute a show of authority. The authoritative message 
communicated by police sirens or flashing patrol car lights is similar to an explicit 
verbal command. California v. HodariD.. I l l S.Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991); Brewer v, 
Inyo County. 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 (1989). 
However, defendant has cited no case in which illumination of an area by police 
with plain, white light constituted a show of authority sufficient to constitute a seizure. 
Indeed, case authority is to the contrary. Police action in illuminating an area with a 
spotlight, without an explicit verbal order to "stop," is insufficient to constitute a 
seizure. United States v. Peoples. 925 F.2d 1082, 1084-1085 (8th Cir.), cert.denjed, 
112 S.Ct. 370 (1991); SS£ also. State v. Tucker. 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) (shining 
flashlight on subject, without order to stop and display of weapon, insufficient to 
constitute detention). 
It is implicit that illuminating the area had two purposes: first, so that the deputy 
could see to further investigate (United States v. Lee. 47 S.Ct. 746, 748 (1925) (use of 
a searchlight is not prohibited by the Constitution); State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 
12 
1981) (not unconstitutional to use a flashlight to help view automobile's interior)), and 
second, for the deputy's security. United States v. Merkley. 988 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 
1993) (quoting United States v. Alexander. 907 F.2d 269, 272 (2nd Cir. 1990), 
cert.denied. I l l S.Ct. 983 (1991) ("A law enforcement agent, faced with the 
possibility of danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to protect himself [or herself] 
. . . .") . 
While defendant and his companions may have been startled by the light, that 
does not mean that they reasonably felt, under the totality of the circumstances, that 
they were not free to leave. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786. Indeed, they were already 
stopped with their headlights off before the area was illuminated. In any event, there is 
no evidence either that the deputy ordered them to stay where they were, or that they 
attempted to leave and were prevented from leaving by police action. The evidence 
establishes only that the deputy approached the illuminated vehicle to further 
investigate. 
In United States v. Memtenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980), the United States 
Supreme Court discussed examples of circumstances "that might indicate a seizure, 
even where the person did not attempt to leave." They include "the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.n IsL None of these 
13 
circumstances is present here. Although the deputy and her partner later approached 
the parked truck, there is no evidence that their presence was threatening, that either 
displayed a weapon, that they physically touched any of the occupants of the truck, or 
that they used a tone of voice in speaking with the occupants indicating that compliance 
with their requests might be compelled.6 In any event, defendant contends that parking 
the patrol car near the pickup truck and illuminating the area were sufficient by 
themselves as a show of authority to constitute a seizure. 
In summary, there is no evidence that this was other than a permissible "level-
one" encounter where an officer approaches and questions a suspect. Munsen. 821 
P.2d n.l at 15. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the truck was not blocked in, and 
police illumination of the area was not a show of authority. The argument that he was 
seized, therefore, is without factual or legal support. 
6
 It is clear from the Probable Cause Statement in support of the charges that 
evidence of a crime was in plain view and immediately incriminating: "[A]s [the 
deputy] made contact with the defendants, she observed a spoon with a white substance 
in the bowl sitting on the dashboard. . . . [The deputy] asked for the spoon and 
defendant Ribe took the spoon, wiped his finger across the bowl of the spoon, 
removing the white substance and then flicked it on the ground" (R. 13). 
14 
Point II 
EVEN IF POLICE ACTION CONSTITUTED A SEIZURE, IT WAS 
BASED UPON THE OFFICER'S REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Deputy Knighton 
had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a 
crime (Def. Br. at 18-21). On the contrary, assuming arguendo, that there was a 
seizure, Deputy Knighton articulated sufficient facts to justify her reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. 
The Terry "reasonable suspicion" standard is objective: "would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . 'warrant a [person] of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" 88 S.Ct. at 
1881. In answering this question, the court must evaluate the officer's conduct in light 
of "common sense and ordinary human experience." United States v. Melendez-
Garcia. 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (ajjoiing United States v, King, 990 F.2d 
1552, 1562 (10th Cir. 1993). It must defer to the ability of a trained law enforcement 
officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. United States v. 
Sokolow. 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989)). And it must make the determination after evaluating 
he "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th 
Cir. 1994). Whether the actions were reasonable "must be judged from the perspective 
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." 
15 
Graham v. CQTOQr, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989). "[I]n justifying the particular 
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry. 88 
S.Ct. at 1880. 
The "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals' Fourth 
Amendment interests" must also be balanced against "the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place. 103 S. 
Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983). "When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally 
intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement 
interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause." IJL 
Before activating the lights on her patrol car, the facts available to Deputy 
Knighton were initially based on her observation of a pickup truck entering an isolated 
construction site, late at night. As she watched, the truck backed in next to the "road 
closed" sign, and parked facing the entrance to the area with its lights turned off. 
Deputy Knighton knew the construction site contained a lot of vehicles, equipment, and 
building supplies, and that, due to the lateness of the hour, no one was working there. 
Finally, Deputy Knighton knew the site was the location of a lot of illegal activity, and 
she had been called there more than once in the past to investigate suspicious activity 
(R. 46-55). 
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Deputy Knighton articulated all of these specific facts during the suppression 
hearing in explaining the basis for her actions. LL Taken together, they are more than 
ample to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the officer's 
further investigation. See Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980) ("A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he [or she] has a reasonable suspicion to believe [the 
person] has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his [or her] name, address and an explanation of his [or 
her] actions"; State v. Baumgaertel. 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988) (citing State v. 
Houser. 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (quoting State v. Folkes. 565 
P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) ("When a police officer sees or hears conduct which 
gives rise to a suspicion of crime, he [or she] has not only the right but the duty to 
make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being violated; 
and if so, to take such measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law"). 
In sum, observing a pickup truck parking near construction equipment and 
supplies late at night, apparently poised for a quick getaway, combined with the 
officer's knowledge of frequent illegal activity at this particular location and her 
experience in being called to investigate suspicious activity there, justified a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity and further investigation. £ L State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 
1231 (Utah App. 1989) (sheriffs knowledge of recent thefts and report that three 
pickup trucks were seen driving into area of the thefts late at night gave rise to 
17 
reasonable suspicion for later stop of the trucks). Therefore, even if, arguendo, 
parking near the pickup truck and illuminating the area constituted a seizure, there was 
a reasonable suspicion to support it. The trial court's conclusion that there was 
reasonable suspicion was correct and should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this tf-K day of February, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed 
by first class mail this February f^ -^ ,, 1997 to: 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 404 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
lbrL>Lt£Kjk& 
18 
Appendix A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SUPPRESSION HEARING. 
NO. 951700249 
RANDOLPH STRUHS 
DEFENDANT 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 19TH DAY 
OF MAY, 1995, THE ABOVE - ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON FOR 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT 
JUDGE, FARMINGTON, UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
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FOR THE DEFENDANT 
WILLIAM MCQUIRE 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
800 WEST STATE ST. 
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74 E. 500 SO. S. 
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OF UTAH 
THE TIME 
EVIDENCE 
STAND. 
COUNSEL 
MAY 19, 1995. 
THE COURT: WE'RE HERE IN THE MATTER OF STATE 
VERSUS RANDOLPH STRUHS. 951700249. 
SET FOR A SUPPRESSION HEARING. 
MR. MCGUIRE: WE'RE READY TO . 
, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. MCGUIRE: WE'D CALL DEPUTY 
JUST 
THIS IS 
PRESENT 
KNIGHTON TO THE 
JUST FOR THE COURT'S INFORMATION, I 
AND I ARE IN AGREEMENT THERE'S 
ISSUE THAT WE'RE LOOKING AT AND THAT IS 
APPROACH 
WHATEVER 
OF THE OFFICER AND WHETHER SHE 
THINK 
REALLY ONLY ONE 
THE INITIAL 
ACTIVATED 
LIGHTS SHE DID, IF THAT CONSTITUES 
OF THE DEFENDANT. I THINK THAT'S ALL WE'RE 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I AGREE, YOUR 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
ILEEN KNIGHTON 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF 
A SEIZURE 
GOING FOR. 
HONOR. 
THE PLAINTIFF, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGUIRE: 
2 
1 Q STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION? 
2 A DEPUTY ILEEN KNIGHTON, DEPUTY PARAMEDIC WITH 
3 DAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE. 
4 Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A POLICE OFFICER? 
5 A I'VE BEEN AN OFFICER FOR ABOUT FIVE YEARS; 
6 THREE OF THAT WITH DAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
7 Q AND DEPUTY KNIGHTON, I REFER YOU TO MARCH 
8 THIRD OF THIS YEAR. WERE YOU ON DUTY ON THAT DAY? 
9 A YES, I WAS. 
10 Q AND WHAT SHIFT WERE YOU ON? 
11 A I WAS ON THE LATE SHIFT, THE GRAVEYARD 
12 SHIFT. 
13 Q OKAY. DID YOU COME IN CONTACT WITH A 
14 RANDOLPH STRUHS ON THAT OCCASION? 
15 A YES, I DID. 
16 Q CAN YOU TELL THE COURT WHERE THAT OCCURRED? 
17 A IT WAS ON CENTER STREET DOWN WHERE THE JORDAN 
18 RIVER INTERSECTS AT THE VERY BOTTOM OF CENTER STREET IN 
19 NORTH SALT LAKE. 
2 0 Q WHAT TYPE OF AREA IS THAT? 
21 A IT'S AN OPEN AREA. THERE'S VERY LITTLE 
22 THERE. THE PEOPLE THAT ARE THERE ARE THERE DURING THE 
23 DAY TO WORK IN THE SEWER PLANT AND THE BUSINESS THAT'S 
24 DOWN NEAR THAT AREA, BUT IT'S A A FIELD AREA. THERE'S 
25 NOTHING THERE. THEY ARE DOING SOME CONSTRUCTION ON 
3 
A 
1 THE BRIDGE. THE BRIDGE WAS REMOVED AND THEY ARE IN THE 
2 PROCESS OF PUTTING A NEW BRIDGE IN. 
3 Q AS A RESULT OF THAT - - AS A RESULT OF THAT 
4 CONSTRUCTION GOING ON, IS THERE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER 
5 ITEMS FOUND IN THAT LOCATION? 
6 A THERE'S A LOT OF EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES THERE 
7 ON A CONTINUING BASIS, YES, AND SUPPLIES AND SO FORTH. 
8 Q AND YOU WERE PATROLLING IN THAT AREA; IS THAT 
9 CORRECT? 
10 A YES. I WAS WESTBOUND ON CENTER STREET IN 
11 NORTH SALT LAKE. 
12 Q WHAT DID YOU OBSERVE? 
13 A I OBSERVED A VEHICLE GOING WESTBOUND ON 
14 CENTER STREET HALF A MILE OR SO AHEAD OF ME AND THEY 
15 WERE GETTING VERY NEAR THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE AND I 
16 BECAME CURIOUS TO KNOW WHERE THEY WERE GOING DOWN 
17 THERE. I SAW THEM GO AND TURN AND PARK AND TURN OFF 
18 THEIR LIGHTS --OR STOP AND TURN OFF THEIR LIGHTS AND I 
19 BECAME CONCERNED AS TO WHY THEY WERE IN THAT AREA, 
20 KNOWING THERE'S A LOT OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, 
21 BUILDING MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES AND SO FORTH THERE. AND 
22 SO I PROCEEDED TO THAT LOCATION TO DETERMINE WHY THE 
23 INDIVIDUAL HAD STOPPED THERE. AND IN THE PROCESS I 
24 TURNED ALL THE LIGHTS OFF OF MY VEHICLE. 
25 Q SO YOU WERE PROCEEDING TOWARD THEM WITHOUT 
4 
1 ANY LIGHTS ON? 
2 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
3 Q AS YOU APPROACHED THE VEHICLE, HOW DID YOU 
4 APPROACH IT? 
5 A I JUST WENT DOWN CENTER STREET UNTIL I GOT 
6 ALMOST TO THE VEHICLE, MAYBE A CAR LENGTH OR SO AWAY, 
7 AND THEN I PARKED IN FRONT OF THE VEHICLE WHICH WAS 
8 FACING EASTBOUND ON CENTER STREET AND I WAS WESTBOUND 
9 ON CENTER STREET. SO IN EFFECT WE WERE NOSE TO NOSE, 
10 IF YOU CAN PUT IT THAT WAY. AND WHEN I WAS CLOSE 
11 ENOUGH THAT I FELT LIKE I WAS READY TO PLACE MY VEHICLE 
12 IN PARK AND INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION, THEN THAT'S WHAT 
13 I DID; PLACED MY VEHICLE IN PARK AND ACTIVATED MY HIGH 
14 BEAM HEADLIGHTS AND WHAT WE CALL OUR TAKEDOWN LIGHTS 
15 WHICH IS AN ILLUMINATING LIGHT THAT'S CONTAINED IN THE 
16 LIGHT BAR, BUT ISN'T A RED OR BLUE LIGHT. IT'S JUST A 
17 CLEAR WHITE LIGHT ON THE TOP OF THE TRUCK. 
18 Q OKAY. AND THAT'S USED FOR ILLUMINATION OF 
19 THE AREA? 
2 0 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 Q AND AFTER YOU ILLUMINATED THE AREA, WHAT DID 
22 YOU DO? 
2 3 A WELL, I SAW THREE INDIVIDUALS IN THE TRUCK; 
24 TWO MALES AND A FEMALE. AND WH2N I ILLUMINATED MY 
25 LIGHT THEY LOOKED UP AND LOOKED TOWARD MY VEHICLE AND I 
5 
1 FELT SOME MOVEMENT, SOME SECRETIVE MOVEMENT. THEY WERE 
2 MOVING --. 
3 MR. ALBRIGHT: OBJECTION AT THIS TIME, YOUR 
4 HONOR. I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM IF THIS IS BEING 
5 OFFERED NOW TO GIVE THE COURT MAYBE SOMEMORE BACKGROUND 
6 OF THE SITUATION, AS LONG AS IT'S NOT BEING OFFERED TO 
7 JUSTIFY WHAT I WOULD CALL THE SHOW OF AUTHORITY OR - -
8 AND THE STOPPING OF THE VEHICLE OR THE DETENTION OF 
9 THOSE PEOPLE INSIDE. I THINK AT THIS POINT THAT WE'VE 
10 REACHED --WE HAVE HAD THE DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY THAT I 
11 WOULD ARGUE AND FROM NOW ON IT'S JUST SIMPLY BACKGROUND 
12 MATERIAL AS TO WHEN THE DRUGS WERE FOUND AND THEN AS WE 
13 ARE INVOLVED WITH DRUGS. 
14 MR. MCGUIRE: THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR. I'LL 
15 JUST ASK ONE FINAL QUESTION. THAT SHOULD BE 
16 SUFFICIENT. 
17 Q AFTER ILLUMINATING THE VEHICLE, DID YOU THEN 
18 APPROACH THE VEHICLE AND CONDUCT YOUR INVESTIGATION? 
19 A YES. MY PARTNER AND I BOTH EXITED OUR 
20 VEHICLE. 
21 Q I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
22 CROSS EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. ALBRIGHT: 
24 Q WERE THERE --AS YOU -- OR AT THE TIME THAT 
25 YOU MADE THE STOP, WERE THERE ACTUAL VEHICLES, 
# 
CONSTRUCTION VEHICLES, IN THE AREA? 
A THERE ARE ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION VEHICLES AND 
EQUIPMENT THAT ARE LEFT AT THE SCENE AS WELL AS 
SUPPLIES AND AT ANY GIVEN DAY IT COULD BE DIFFERENT 
SUPPLIES AND DIFFERENT VEHICLES. 
Q MY QUESTION GOES TO SPECIFICALLY THAT NIGHT. 
WERE THERE CONSTRUCTION VEHICLES IN THE AREA AS FAR AS 
YOU REMEMBER? 
A YES, THEY WERE. 
Q AND HOW FAR WERE THEY FROM WHERE YOU MADE THE 
STOP? 
A I HAVE TO -- I'M NOT SO GOOD WITH DISTANCE. 
I WOULD GUESS A COUPLE OF HUNDRED FEET. 
Q OKAY. AND THE AREA WHERE THE CONSTRUCTION 
ZONE IS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT, DOES IT HAVE A BARRICADE 
AROUND IT? 
A THERE'S SIGNS, MOVEABLE SIGNS, THAT ARE 
THERE. ONE OF THEM SAYS THAT THE ROAD IS CLOSED AND 
THE OTHER IS A REFLECTIVE TYPE SIGN. 
Q I SEE. AND THEY HADN'T GONE PAST THAT? 
A THEY HAD TURNED AND PARKED AND BACKED INTO 
WHERE THE SIGNS WERE FACING EAST. 
Q BUT THEY HADN'T GONE PAST THE BARRICADE? 
A NO, NOT AT THAT TIME. 
Q NOW, I BELIEVE THAT -- DID YOU FEEL WHEN YOU 
7 
1 CAME UP TO THESE INDIVIDUALS THAT YOU HAD A HUNCH OR 
2 SUSPICION THAT THERE MAY BE SOME CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
3 INVOLVED HERE; IS THAT RIGHT? 
4 I A MY QUESTION WAS WHETHER THERE WAS INDEED 
5 CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
6 Q AND YOU HAD A SUSPICION? 
7 A YES, THAT THERE MIGHT BE - - AND THAT 
8 SUSPICION WAS ON THE FACT THAT --. 
9 Q LET ME JUST FINISH, IF I COULD. THAT THEY 
10 WERE WITHIN A COUPLE OR 100 FEET OF THE CONSTRUCTION 
11 ZONE? 
12 A YES, AND KNOWING THE EQUIPMENT THAT WAS 
13 THERE. 
14 Q OKAY. AS YOU STOPPED AND OBSERVED THESE 
15 INDIVIDUALS, THEY -- BEFORE YOU ACTIVATED YOUR LIGHTS, 
16 THEY HAD NOT GOT OUT OF THE CAR AND GONE OVER TOWARD 
17 ANY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AREA, HAD THEY? 
18 A NO, THEY HADN'T. 
19 Q OKAY. 
20 A IF THESE LIGHTS THAT YOU TURN ON AS YOU --
21 THESE TAKEDOWN LIGHTS, THEY ARE ON TOP OF YOUR VEHICLE; 
22 IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 3 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
24 Q WHAT TYPE OF VEHICLE DO YOU DRIVE? WHAT WAS 
25 IT THAT NIGHT THAT YOU WERE DRIVING? 
8 
1 A IT'S A UKON TYPE VEHICLE, A CHEVY BLAZER UKON 
2 TYPE PACKAGE. 
3 Q HOW IS IT MARKED? IS IT INDICATED AS LAW 
4 ENFORCEMENT? 
5 A THERE'S DECALS ON THE DOOR AND DECALS ON THE 
6 HATCH, THE TAILGATE AND THE REAR AND THEN THE LIGHT BAR 
7 ON THE TOP. 
8 Q AND THE LIGHT BAR HAS THE DIFFERENT COLORED 
9 RED AND BLUE LIGHTS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
10 A RED AND BLUE AND THE WHITE TAKEDOWNS. 
11 Q AND YOU'RE CLEARLY -- YOU AND YOUR COMPANION, 
12 HOWEVER YOU REFER TO IT -- WAS IT A PARTNER? 
13 A PARTNER. 
14 Q YOU AND YOUR PARTNER WERE BOTH IN YOUR 
15 UNIFORMS AT THE TIME? 
16 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
17 Q IS THERE ANY OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS ON THE 
18 VEHICLE SUCH AS MAYBE OTHER OUTSIDE LIGHTS THAT YOU 
19 COULD CONTROL OR --? 
2 0 A IT HAS NO SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE THE TAKEDOWNS ARE 
21 USED IN PLACE OF THE SPOTLIGHTS. 
22 Q I KNOW--
2 3 A THE ONLY OTHER LIGHTS THAT ARE ON IT ARE WHAT1 
24 WE CALL GRILL LIGHTS. BUT THEY WERE NOT ACTIVATED. 
2 5 Q CAN YOU LOOK AT THE VEHICLE AND OBSERVE THAT 
9 
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THOSE LIGHTS ARE PRESENT THERE? 
A 
YOU CAN. 
Q 
HONOR. 
AS YOU JUST STAND BACK AND 
ALL RIGHT. I HAVE NOTHING 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGUIRE: 
Q 
LOOK AT THAT, YES, 
FURTHER, YOUR 
COUNSEL ASKED YOU WHETHER THE REASON 
SUSPICIONS WERE DUE TO THE EQUIPMENT 
LOCATION AND YOU SAID THAT WAS ONE OF 
DID THE ' rYPE OF THE SITUATION ENTER 
SUSPICIONS? 
A 
REALLY NO 
THAT HOUR 
Q 
A 
HOUR, IF ' 
Q 
INTO YOUR 
YEAH, AS IT WAS A LATE HOUR 
WORKERS THAT WOULD BE DOWN 
OF NIGHT. 
BEING 
' THE 
INTO 
. AND 
FOR YOUR 
\ DOWN IN THAT 
REASONS. 
YOUR 
THERE IS 
IN THAT AREA AT 
WHAT TIME WAS IT, BY THE WAY? 
I HAVE TO REFER TO MY REPORT FOR THE 
rHAT'S ALL RIGHT. IT WAS A1 
WAS THERE ANYTHING BESIDES 
SUSPICIONS THE TIME OF DAY, 
'9:58 
THAT 
THE 
1 P.M. 
THAT 
FACT 
EXACT 
• 
WENT 
THAT 
WORKERS WERE NOT DOWN THERE AND THE FACT THAT THERE WAS 
EQUIPMENT 
A 
DOWN THERE? 
OTHER THAN THAT, OTHER THAN THE 
OFTENTIMES THERE IS ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
THERE. 
FACT THAT 
WHICH OCCURS DOWN 
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STOP 
YOUR 
Q 
_ ? 
A 
Q 
OF A 
YOU'VE BEEN ON CALLS INVOLVING THAT TYPE 
YES, I HAVE. 
NOW, IF YOU WERE TO ACTUALLY BE EFFECTING A 
VEHICLE OR SOMETHING OF TWAT NATURE DURING 
DUTIES, WHAT LIGHTS DO YOU ACTIVATE? 
A 
LIGHTS --
POSITIONS 
THAT 
I ACTIVATE ALL OF THE LIGHTS, THE OVERHEAD 
THREE ARE POSITIONS AND I ACTIVATE ALL THREE 
, SO RED, BLUE AND WHITE. THE TAKEDOWN LIGHT 
I USED THAT NIGHT I DID NOT ACTIVATE WITH MY 
OVERHEAD 
THEIR OWN 
Q 
LIGHTS SWITCH. THEY HAVE A SEPARATE SWITCH OF 
• 
I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ALBRIGHT: 
PUT J 
YOU ] 
0 
DOWN 1 
I BELIEVE IN YOUR REPORT, OFFICER, WHEN YOU 
UNDER THE HEADING, " INITIAL OBSERVATIONS", 
DID NOT MAKE ANY REFERENCE AT ALL TO TURNING ON ANY] 
OF YOUR LIGHTS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THIS 
A 
Q 
TIME 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, "OUR HONOR. 
MR. MCGUIRE: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. MCGUIRE: WE HAVE NO FURTHER EVIDENCE AT 
, YOUR HONOR. 
11 
A. 
1 MR. ALBRIGHT: YOUR HONOR, SIMPLY WE WOULD 
2 NOT HAVE MR. STRUHS TAKE THE STAND AT THIS TIME. I'M 
3 PREPARED TO ARGUE THE CASE. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. 
5 MR. MCGUIRE: YOUR HONOR, IN PRESENTATION OF 
6 THE STATE'S PORTION OF THE CASE, I THINK WHAT WE HAVE 
7 GOT HERE IS A SITUATION WHERE THE OFFICER WAS CONCERNED 
8 ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHE WAS OBSERVING, THE 
9 LATE NIGHT HOURS IN AN ISOLATED LOCATION WHERE NO ONE 
10 GENERALLY IS THERE AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT. IT'S A 
11 LOCATION WHERE PEOPLE WORK DURING THE DAY. THERE'S 
12 EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS DOWN THERE THAT IN THE PAST 
13 HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. SHE 
14 HAD EVERY RIGHT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THAT SITUATION. 
15 SHE SAW THE VEHICLE STOPPED. IT TURNED OUT ITS LIGHTS 
16 AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME SHE TURNED OFF HER LIGHTS AND 
17 APPROACHED THE VEHICLE. 
18 WHEN SHE GOT TO THE VEHICLE SHE TURNED ON HER 
19 HEADLIGHTS AS WELL AS HER OVERHEAD ILLUMINATING LIGHTS 
20 ALL OF THAT, I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT, IS CONSISTENT] 
21 WITH A LEVEL ONE TYPE ENCOUNTER WHERE SHE THEN WENT TO 
22 THEM, DISCUSSED WITH THEM THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND HAD A 
23 RIGHT TO LOOK AT THAT CIRCUMSTANCE AS AN OFFICER. IT 
24 DOES NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL TWO SITUATION WHICH WOULD 
25 THEN REQUIRE REASONABLE SUSPICION. EVEN IF IT DID, I 
12 
1 THINK THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUFFICIENT THERE THAT SHE 
2 HAD AT LEAST REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT SOMETHING OF A 
3 CRIMINAL NATURE WAS AFOOT. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT 
4 THE FACTS WOULD RISE TO THAT LEVEL TWO. I THINK IT'S 
5 STILL A LEVEL ONE SITUATION. SHE WAS ILLUMINATING A 
6 DARK AREA. SHE WAS APPROACHING A VEHICLE WHICH WAS 
7 ALREADY STOPPED AT THAT LOCATION AND I THINK THAT'S 
8 SUFFICIENT FOR HER ACTIVITIES ON THE CASE. 
9 MR. ALBRIGHT: I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO NOTE 
10 AT THE ONSET, YOUR HONOR, THAT WE HAVE NO VIOLATIONS OF 
11 LAW THAT ARE OBSERVED BY THE OFFICERS TO START WITH. 
12 THE CRITICAL ISSUE I SEE IS WHETHER WE HAVE A DISPLAY 
13 OF AUTHORITY WHEN SHE PULLS UP. IF THERE'S A DISPLAY 
14 OF AUTHORITY, THEN THERE MUST BE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR 
15 EVEN A BRIEF INVESTIGATORY DETENTION BY THE OFFICER. 
16 THAT MEANS BASICALLY THAT THERE HAS TO BE REASONABLE 
17 SUSPICION UPON OBJECTIVE FACTS. SOME OF THE THINGS WE 
18 HEAR FROM HER ARE SUBJECTIVE; HER FEELINGS, HER 
19 SUSPICIONS, HER HUNCHES. 
20 BUT WHAT WE'RE DEALING WITH ARE OBJECTIVE 
21 FACTS. THAT'S WHAT THE LAW IS. THE OBJECTIVE FACT IS 
22 THAT IT WASN'T EVEN TEN O'CLOCK AT NIGHT. IT'S 200 
23 FEET FROM EQUIPMENT. AND NO ONE IS OUT OF THE VEHICLE 
24 AT ALL AT THIS TIME. THEY HAVE SIMPLY STOPPED AT A 
25 PLACE THEY HAD AN ABILITY TO STOP AT. THERE'S NO 
13
 A 
1 VIOLATION OF LAW WHERE THEY WERE. THE OVERHEAD LIGHTS 
2 BEING TURNED ON IN THE STATE VERSUS DAVIS -- I WOULD 
3 JUST TAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT FROM THE HOLDING OF THE 
4 COURT THERE. " THE OFFICER THEN DETAINED THE 
5 INDIVIDUAL BY DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY. " NOW, IT DOESN'T 
6 NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE THE RED AND BLUE LIGHTS, AS LONG 
7 AS WE HAVE DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY. AND I WOULD SUBMIT 
8 THAT COMING NOSE TO NOSE IN A MARKED VEHICLE AND IN 
9 UNIFORMS TURNING ON - - AND SPECIFICALLY COASTING UP 
10 SOME STREET AND THEN AT THE VERY LAST MOMENT STOPPING 
11 NOSE TO NOSE WITH THE VEHICLE AND TURNING ON YOUR 
12 OVERHEAD TAKEDOWN LIGHTS AND IN A MARKED VEHICLE, IN A 
13 VEHICLE THAT YOU CAN SEE THE RED AND BLUE GRILL 
14 EMERGENCY LIGHTS AND OFFICERS GETTING OUT, IS IN FACT A| 
15 SHOW OF AUTHORITY. AND ONCE WE HAVE THAT -- AND THE 
16 STATE, AS HELD BY THE COURT IN STATE VERSUS DAVIS, THE 
17 OFFICER DETAINED BY A DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY HOW HE 
18 DETAINED THEM AND WHEN HE ACTIVATED OVERHEAD LIGHTS ON 
19 HIS VEHICLE. AND ONCE THAT HAPPENED, THEN THE OFFICER 
20 HAS TO HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION ON OBJECTIVE FACTS 
21 THAT A VIOLATION OF LAW HAS OCCURRED. AND WE HAVE 
22 NO -- WE DO NOT HAVE THOSE OBJECTIVE FACTS HERE. I'LL 
23 SUBMIT IT. 
24 MR. MCGUIRE: JUST IN RESPONSE TO THAT, I 
25 THINK STATE V. DAVIS IS DISTINGUISHABLE UPON THAT 
14 
OFFICR'S SHOW OF AUTHORITY THAT THEY ARE MAKING THE 
STOP. HERE YOU HAVE A STOPPED VEHICLE. YOU HAVE 
LIGHTS BEING TURNED ON TO ILLUMINATE IT. AND IN FACT, 
THESE PEOPLE, WHEN THEY WERE HIT WITH THOSE LIGHTS, 
THERE'S NO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COURT THAT THEY KNEW IT 
WAS AN OFFICER, THAT THEY KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON AT 
ALL. THE DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY IS SOMETHING MORE THAN 
AN OFFICER APPROACHING. WE HAVE CASE AFTER CASE WHERE 
OFFICERS APPROACHED. THEY APPROACH IN A MARKED 
VEHICLE. THEY GET OUT TO TALK TO THE INDIVIDUAL. AND 
THERE'S NO RISE OF THAT SITUATION TO A LEVEL TWO 
CATEGORY. THE OFFICERS HAVE A RIGHT TO COME AND STOP 
OR WHERE SOMEBODY HAS ALREADY STOPPED, APPROACH THEM 
AND SPEAK WITH THEM ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR 
SITUATION THAT THEY ARE THERE FOR.. I THINK WE HAVE A 
LEVEL ONE CIRCUMSTANCE. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: COULD I JUST CORRECT THE 
RECORD SOMEWHAT, YOUR HONOR. MAY I DO THAT? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: STATE VERSUS DAVIS STATES THE 
CAR IN DAVIS WAS STOPPED BEFORE THE OFFICER HAD 
ARRIVED. SO DAVIS, JUST AS IN THIS SITUATION, HAD 
STOPPED. HE WAS SEATED IN HIS VEHICLE AND HAD STOPPED 
INDEPENDENT OF ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE OFFICER. SO I 
WOULD -- I'M JUST POINTING THAT OUT THAT COUNSEL TRIED 
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1 TO DISTINGUISH THIS FROM DAVIS, BUT WE HAVE PRETTY MUCH 
2 THE SAME FACT PATTERN WHERE THE VEHICLE HAD BEEN 
3 STOPPED WITHOUT ANY ACTION BY THE OFFICER. 
4 MR. MCGUIRE: WELL, THAT'S WHERE WE DIFFER. 
5 THESE ARE OVERHEAD LIGHTS, REDS AND BLUES ON IN DAVIS. 
6 WE DON'T HAVE THAT IN THIS SITUATION. 
7 WE HAVE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COURT THAT IN 
8 HER TAKING AND STOPPING PEOPLE FOR VIOLATIONS, REDS AND 
9 BLUES ARE USED. I THINK THAT'S THE DISTINGUISHING 
10 FACTOR. 
11 MR. ALBRIGHT: AGAIN, I WOULD CORRECT 
12 COUNSEL. THE ONLY THING DAVIS STATES IS THE OFFICER 
13 THEN DETAINED DAVIS BY A DISPLAY OF AUTHORITY WHEN HE 
14 ACTIVATES HIS OVERHEAD LIGHTS. THAT DOESN'T SAY THE 
15 RED AND BLUE. WE HAVE OVERHEAD LIGHTS HERE. WE HAVE 
16 LIGHTS ON TOP OF THE BAR. SO IT DOESN'T SPECIFICALLY 
17 SAY IT WAS A SHOW OF THE RED AND BLUE LIGHTS IN DAVIS. 
18 IT JUST SAYS LIGHTS THAT WERE OVERHEAD. AND THAT'S WHAT 
19 WE HAVE HERE, OVERHEAD LIGHTS AS WELL. NOW, I'LL LEAVE 
20 THAT UP TO THE COURT TO GIVE THE WEIGHT TO COUNSEL'S 
21 ARGUMENT. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, I GUESS ONE OF THE THINGS 
23 THAT CONCERNS THE COURT, OBVIOUSLY THE FACT SITUATION I 
24 THINK MAYBE WAS KNOWN AHEAD OF TIME. AND I AM 
25 CONCERNED THAT, MR. ALBRIGHT, THERE WASN'T A BRIEF 
1 6
 ^ O 
FILED AT ALL SO THAT I COULD LOOK AT THAT PRIOR AND J 
PARTICULARLY TO GIVE THE STATE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND 
TO THE CASE IN A BRIEF. SO WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS 
ALLOW THE STATE TO RESPOND, IF THEY WANT TO CITE CASES 
DISTINGUISHING, THAT AND I'M GOING TO RESERVE RULING. 
I DON'T NEED A FULL-BLOWN MEMORANDUM. I JUST NEED YOU 
TO CITE, IF YOU BELIEVE -- YOU'VE GOT STATE VERSUS 
DAVIS AND I CAN READ THAT. BUT I THINK IN THIS 
CIRCUMSTANCE NOT FILING THE MEMORANDUM BECAUSE YOU ARE 
RELYING ON THAT, THAT I'M GOING TO ALLOW THE STATE TIME 
TO STATE TO THE COURT --. I UNDERSTAND THE 
DISTINGUISHING FACTS THAT YOU'VE DONE. IF YOU JUST 
WANT TO CITE THE CASE TO THE COURT OR CASES THAT YOU 
BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD LOOK AT IN DOING THAT, THEN I CAN 
MAKE A RECORD ON THOSE CASES AND ISSUE A WRITTEN RULING 
BASED ON THAT. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: AND YOUR HONOR, I HAVE TALKED 
WITH MR. MCGUIRE SEVERAL DAYS AND TOLD HIM I WASN'T 
GOING TO FILE A BRIEF BECAUSE I FELT THE ISSUE WE'VE 
TALKED AND DISCUSSED THIS CASE PRIOR. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND, BUT YOU JUST -- I 
THINK GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, THAT THE STATE 
NEEDS OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND SO THAT I COULD REVIEW 
THOSE, AND BASED ON THAT I THINK THE FACT SITUATION IS 
FAIRLY STRAIGHTFORWARD TO ISSUE A RULING. 
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1 MR. ALBRIGHT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR 
2 HONOR. 
3 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
18 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH- ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, JOANNE PRATT, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL 
REPORTER, READING IN KAYSVILLE, UTAH, AT THE TIME AND 
PLACE SHOWN HEREIN; 
THAT SAID PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED BY ME IN 
STENOTYPE, AfsjD WERE THEREAFTER BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO 
TYPEWRITTEN fc0RM CONSISTING OF PAGES / THROUGH/^ BOTH 
INCLUSIVE. 
THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION
 0F SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT OF KIN OR OTHERWISE 
ASSOCIATED WIJH ANY OF THE PARTIES HEREIN, OR THEIR COUNSEL, 
AND THAT I AM NOT INTERESTED IN THE EVENT THEREOF. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT FARMINGTON, UTAH, 
THIfc? T"*** DAY OF (\rU, / ? 7 S " 
>/ CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
CUTAH CSR NO. 21*0 
Appendix B 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS inOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
RANDOLPH PAUL STRUHS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
1 : ; t « ^ . . . . ; : : ; • - ' 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
| MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 951700249 
The Court heard oral argument in the above-entitled matter on May 19, 1995, and has 
reviewed the documents on file with the Court. In addition, the Court has also reviewed the 
pertinent case law in this area, including in particular, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991). Having done so, and now being fully advised, 
the Court enters the following findings of fact and ruling: 
1. The Court finds that on or about March 3, 1995, at aoproximately 9:58 p.m., 
Deputy Sheriff Eilene Knighton, while proceeding West Bound on Center Street, observed 
Defendant's vehicle traveling into a construction zone area located in North Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which, based on her five (5) years of experience as a peace officer, the Deputy noted 
was a prior spot for illegal activity. 
2. That Deputy Knighton also observed Defendant's vehicle stop and the head 
lights extinguish when Defendant's vehicle entered an area where construction vehicles and 
equipment were located. 
3. However, the Court further finds that no one emerged from Defendant's vehicle 
after it stopped and its head lights were turned off. 
4. That Deputy Knighton turned off the head lights on her patrol vehicle and 
coasted to the front of Defendant's vehicle where the fronts of their respective vehicles faced 
each other. 
5. At that point, the Court finds that Deputy Knighton activated the white 
overhead lights on her patrol vehicle, also referred to as "take down" lights, as well as her 
high-beam headlights, which enabled Deputy Knighton to observe suspicious movements 
within the defendant's vehicle and eventually led to her discovery of controlled substances and 
drug paraphernalia within Defendant's vehicle. However, the Court specifically finds that at 
no time did Deputy Knighton activate the red and blue emergency lights on her patrol vehicle. 
In the instant case, the Court finds the foregoing factual finding particularly significant 
because Defendant's primary argument centers around the very contention that at the moment 
Deputy Knighton activated the overhead lights on her vehicle, a display of authority occurred 
which constituted a detention subject to Fourth Amendment protection under State v. Davis. 
821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, Defendant correctly cites to and relies on Davis for 
the proposition set forth above. However, the facts in Davis are silent as to the specific type 
of overhead lights the officer in that case activated, i.e., whether or not the overhead lights 
were the white lights/"take down" lights, the red and blue emergency lights, or both. 
Thus, while Defendant's argument is not misplaced, the facts contained in Davis are 
simply not specific enough for this Court to conclude that a detention occurred at the moment 
Deputy Knighton activated the white overhead lights on her patrol vehicle. Furthermore, the 
Court need not specifically address the merits of this issue because, even assuming arguendo 
that a detention did in fact occur at the moment when the overhead lights were activated, 
Deputy Knighton had reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that Defendant had 
either committed a crime, was in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to commit 
a crime. 
Once again, prior to activating the overhead lights on her patrol vehicle, Deputy 
Knighton observed Defendant's vehicle on a Friday, at 9:58 p.m., in an area known for prior 
illegal activity. Finally, Deputy Knighton observed Defendant's vehicle stop in an area where 
construction vehicles and equipment were located, at which time the head lights on 
Defendant's vehicle were extinguished. However, no one emerged from Defendant's vehicle. 
Therefore, when considering the aforementioned findings of fact, to wit: findings of 
fact 1-4, the Court r :hat Deputy Knighton unquestionably had reasonable suspicion, based 
on articulable facts, that criminal activity was afoot prior to the time she activated the 
overhead lights on her patrol vehicle. 
Thus, given that, the Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated June 6, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the 
of June, postage prepaid, to the following: 
William K. McGuire, Esq. 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
William J. Albright, Esq 
2612 South 450 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
lichael D. Di Reda 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
